Eloquent Incoherence

Cross-posted at Eteraz.org

Robert Spencer has made a career out of attacking Islam. The author of books with titles such as The Truth About Muhammad: Founder of the World’s Most Intolerant Religion, Spencer claims his writings are geared toward “calling attention to the roots and goals of jihad violence”. His main outlet is his blog, JihadWatch.org (to which his sidekick Hugh Fitzgerald also contributes). Spencer’s “scholarship” generally follows a pattern:

• Cite a recent incident of extremist violence or rhetoric in the Muslim World

• Quote the centuries-old writings of well-respected scholars (often selectively) or make blanket statements about Islamic law in an attempt to draw a causal connection between mainstream Islamic doctrines and modern extremism

• Bridge the gap in relevance between ceturies-old doctrines and modern-day problems by claiming that the “gates of ijtihad are closed”, that Muslims are thus completely bound by the rulings of long-dead jurists, and that reform is therefore impossible

• Dismiss (or simply neglect to discuss) the significance of archaic international norms of warfare and diplomacy in the formulation of centuries-old doctrines relating to jihad

• Dismiss (or simply neglect to discuss) Muslim scholars and leaders who criticize jihadist ideology and extremism

• Dismiss (or simply neglect to discuss) the role of socioeconomic realities or postcolonial dynamics in fostering terrorism and extremism

• Dismiss (or simply neglect to discuss) the role of American foreign policies in fostering terrorism and extremism

Needless to say, his work would not be taken seriously if he applied a similar approach to any other field of study. However, given the current political climate, a third-rate “expert” such as Spencer can find a large audience for his pseudo-scholarship, thereby lending him an aura of legitimacy. His posts on JihadWatch garner dozens of comments from back-patting cheerleaders who post under names like “DownWithIslam” and call for “sand niggers” to be shot. Spencer has appeared on numerous mainstream television and radio talk shows and been invited to lead a seminar on Islam before the Department of Homeland Security’s Joint Terrorism Taskforce.

Because of the simplistic nature of Spencer’s analysis, many Muslim leaders may not wish to dignify his work with a response or may find it distasteful to engage with him. But due to his unfortunate influence within mainstream circles, Muslim leaders active in the public relations sector must deal with his views whether they want to or not. Fortunately, JihadWatch is replete with examples of the flawed logic endemic in Spencer’s writings, and demonstrates that refuting him is a rather easy task.

For instance, in a recent post, Spencer linked to a news report about a spate of bombings in Peshawar, Pakistan targeting music and video shops. The attacks were apparently the work of hardliners who believe music, television, and movies are un-Islamic. In his commentary on the incident, Spencer writes:

Islamic law forbids music (cf. ‘Umdat al-Salik r40.1), although this law has of course often been ignored… But the law remains — it has never been reformed or rejected by any significant Islamic authority. Consequently it can always be reasserted, as here.”

The assertion that the view of music as Islamically forbidden “has never been reformed or rejected by any significant Islamic authority” is patently false, and should make anyone even mildly familiar with the intellectual history of Islam do a double-take. In fact, the annals of Islamic scholarship are replete with lively, nuanced debate on the subject of music. Though many scholars were indeed of the opinion that music and singing are impermissible, there is no shortage of dissenters from that view. Al-Ghazali, a renowned 11th century Islamic theologian and jurist, wrote an extensive treatise on the subject and concluded that music is permissible except if temptation is feared. Imam ibn Hazm and Qadi Abu Bakr ibn al-Arabi, two of the leading scholars of Muslim Spain, wer of the opinion that the use of musical instruments and singing are permissible. Contemporary scholars who have approved of music and singing include Yusuf al-Qaradawi and Muzammil Siddiqi. These Islamic authorities can hardly be described as insignificant.

Spencer also fails to mention another prominent issue addressed by Islamic law relevant to the Peshawar incidents: vigilantism. Even if Spencer’s claim about the impermissibility of music is correct, he provides no clue as to what principle of Islamic law allows ordinary citizens to take it upon themselves to punish offenders. Spencer sidesteps this gap in his analysis by using the passive voice; according to Spencer, the prohibition against music “has… often been ignored”, but “can always be reasserted.” But by who? Even the most conservative jurists vehemently disapproved of civilians taking the law into their own hands, and maintenance of law and order is a prominent theme in classical Islamic political theory. Early Islamic jurist Imam Malik (founder one of the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence) wrote, “60 years of tyranny are better than one hour of civil strife.” Acts of vigilantism generally fit into a category of crimes termed hiraba, a subject that Islamic scholars both classical and contemporary have discussed extensively.

In short, the same body of traditional scholarship on Islamic law that Spencer claims justifies such attacks also includes ample evidence to the contrary–evidence that he obscures through blanket statements and rhetorical slights of hand. It’s unclear whether Spencer is simply unaware of this information or has consciously ignored it. But it matters little as far as his competency as an authority is concerned; if the former is the case, he’s incompetent, if the latter is the case, he’s disingenious and intellectually dishonest. In any event, continuously exposing and refuting Spencer’s amateur attempts at scholarship would do much to discredit Islamophobia in the long run.

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See also:

http://www.eteraz.org/story/2007/3/1/1421/36075

http://www.eteraz.org/story/2007/3/2/123136/0820

http://www.eteraz.org/story/2007/3/2/141835/4181

http://www.eteraz.org/story/2007/3/4/65215/02266

http://www.eteraz.org/story/2007/3/4/17842/76463

http://www.eteraz.org/story/2007/4/7/162445/8892

The other day I was talking with a relative and the subject of the Shi’a-Sunni divide came up. I mentioned how unfortunate Shi’a-Sunni violence and tensions are. She agreed with me in principle, but mentioned that the Shi’a are “very different from us” due to their “deviant” beliefs. She went on to mention a number of widely-held misconceptions about Shi’a beliefs. For some reason, I’ve always found this issue interesting, and have read about it and discussed it with both Shi’a and Sunnis. In my discussions with my Sunni friends and relatives, I’ve often heard the same rumors and misconceptions repeated about the Shi’a by educated, otherwise liberal-minded Muslims like my relative. These myths seem to be so widespread that I think they should be addressed.

Myth #1: The Shi’a are deviants/heretics because they have a different Shahadah.

Reality: Belief in the Shahadah–the Arabic phrase La ilaha il Allah Muhammadur-Rasul Allah (”There is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”)–is the first and most important pillar of Islam, and is common to both Shi’a and Sunnis [1]. The misconception that Shi’a have a different Shahadah stems from an addendum that Shi’a sometimes add: wa ‘Ali wali-ullah (”And ‘Ali is the friend of Allah”). Shi’a most commonly recite the addendum as part of their ‘adhaan (call to prayer). They do not regard the addendum as an obligatory part of the Shahadah, and La ilaha il Allah Muhammadur-Rasul Allah wa ‘Ali wali-ullah (”There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah and ‘Ali is the friend of Allah”) is viewed as a variant of the standard Shahadah. The claim of some Sunnis that this variant Shahada constitutes heresy stems from an apparent belief that the literal text of the standard Shahadah is sacrosanct and unchangeable, a view that is unsupported by Sunni tradition. Sunnis also have variants of the Shahadah, such as Ash-shadu an-la ilaha il Allah wa ash-shadu anna Muhammadur-Rasul Allah (”I bear witness that there is no god but Allah and I bear witness that Muhammad is the messenger of Allah”) and Ash-shadu an-la ilaha il Allahu wahdahu la shareeka la wa ash-shadu anna sayyidina nabiyyana maulana Muhammadan ‘abduhu wa rasuluhu (”I bear witness that there is no god but Allah, He is One without associates to Him, and I bear witness that our master, our prophet, our patron Muhammad is his slave and messenger”). Neither the standard Shahadah nor any of its variants appear anywhere in the Qur’an, nor are there any ahadith ascribing a sacred status to the literal text of La ilaha il Allah Muhammadur-Rasul Allah. Rather, only the underlying idea of one God whose final messenger is Muhammad, a belief shared by Shi’a and Sunnis, is regarded as inviolable. The Shi’a base the reference to ‘Ali as the friend (wali) of Allah on verse 5:55 of the Qur’an, “Only Allah is your wali and His messenger and those who believe, those who keep up prayers and pay the poor-rate while they bow,” which, according to Sunni and Shi’a sources, was revealed in honor of ‘Ali after he gave his ring to a beggar while he was in prostration. Furthermore, the Shi’a base their recitation of ‘Ali wali-ullah as part of the adhaan on what they believe to be a tradition of the Prophet; in a hadith found in several Shi’a sources, the Prophet (SAW) is said to have approved of the practice after it was initiated by the companions Salman al-Farisi and Abu Dharr al-Ghafari. Shi’a claim that the hadith has been reported by Sunni scholars [2].

Myth #2: The Shi’a are deviants because they pray with their hands to the side, as opposed to the “proper” way of folding the hands across the midsection.

Reality: Followers of the Maliki school of jurisprudence, who comprise the majority of Sunni Muslims in West Africa and a sizable minority of Sunni Muslims in North Africa, also pray with their hands to their sides. This centuries-old position of the Maliki school is well-documented and supported with evidence from the practice of the people of Medina and various companions of the Prophet (SAW). Anyone who thinks Shi’a are deviants because of the manner in which they pray must also think that their Sunni brothers in West and North Africa are deviants as well.

Myth #3: The Shi’a are heretics because they believe that Allah intended for ‘Ali to be given Prophethood, but the Angel Jibril made a mistake and gave Muhammad the revelation instead.

Reality: The Ithna-Ashari Shi’a–the mainstream branch of Shi’ism followed by over 95% of all Shi’a–believe no such thing. This belief belongs to the ‘Alawi sect, a tiny offshoot of Shi’ism whose adherents are concentrated mainly in Syria and number no more than two million (Syria’s government, including the Assad family, is comprised mostly of ‘Alawis). ‘Alawis also apparently ascribe divinity to ‘Ali as part of a trinitarian notion of God not unlike Christianity. The overwhelming majority of mainstream Shi’a and Sunni scholars consider the beliefs of the ‘Alawi sect heretical.

Myth #4: The Shi’a are heretics because they believe ‘Ali was a prophet.

Reality: See myths #1 and #3.

Myth #5: The Shi’a are deviants because they only pray 3 times a day.

Reality: The five daily prayers–Fajr (early morning), Dhuhr (early afternoon), ‘Asr (late afternoon), Maghrib (evening), and ‘Isha (night)–are common to both Shi’a and Sunnis. The misconception that Shi’a have only 3 prayers stems from the common Shi’a practice of combining Dhuhr with ‘Asr and Maghrib with ‘Isha. Sunnis also combine these prayers in the case of travel, inclement weather, war, or other exceptional circumstances. Shi’a jurisprudence takes a broader view toward the permissibility of combining prayers, holding that prayers may be combined for any reason. Thus, the Shi’a practice of performing the 5 prayers in 3 sittings has been twisted into the misconceived fiction that the Shi’a believe in only 3 prayers [3]. Because the Hanafi school of jurisprudence takes the most restrictive position on the issue of combining prayers, this misconception is particularly common in Hanafi-dominated South Asia.

Myth #6: The Shi’a believe in mut’a (temporary marriage), which is a form of prostitution.

Reality: Shi’a and Sunnis both agree that mut’a was permissible in the early days of Islam. According to the Sunni view, Prophet Muhammad (SAW) declared the practice forbidden following the campaign at Khaybar. Shi’a do not accept the hadith Sunnis point to in support of their view and trace the ban on mut’a to ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab, whose authority they do not recognize. According the the Shi’a view, ‘Umar outlawed mut’a on his own initiative during the third year of his reign as Khalifa. In any event, mut’a is not a from of prostitution per se. Ayatollah ‘Ali al-Sistani, the world’s highest-ranking Shi’a authority, views permission of the woman’s guardian as a requirement for mut’a, which would be difficult to obtain if he proposes a term of only a few hours. Shi’a put forth a number of social policy justifications for why the permissibility of mut’a is just and proper, such as the minimization of messy and emotionally painful divorces through the institution of a marriage “trial period”. Furthermore, the practice of mut’a is often little different from misyar (travelers’ marriage), a similar concept that many Sunni authorities hold to be permissible. In a misyar marriage, a man marries a woman without assuming any of the responsibilities of a regular marriage (e.g. financial support) or taking up residence with his wife. In practice, many men enter into misyar marriages without any intention of transitioning the union into a regular marriage, and end the arrangement with a divorce. The practice is legitimized through the misapplication of a fatwa by Imam Abu Hanifa, who once ruled that marrying a woman with the intention of divorcing her is permissible. The net effect is often the same as mut’a.

Through this discussion, I do not mean to convey that I agree with the Shi’a. I do not believe in the Shi’a variant of the Shahadah. I do not pray with my hands to my sides (after all, I’m not a Maliki either). I do not combine my prayers without a good reason. I view any form of marriage entered into with the intention of eventual divorce as morally repugnant. I am a committed Sunni, and I find many aspects of Shi’ism problematic (the doctrine of the Imamate, and the hostility towards certain wives and companions of the Prophet that pervades much of Shi’a thought). However, the doctrinal differences between the Shi’a and Sunnis are not going away any time soon. To the extent that Shi’a-Sunni hostility stems from widely-held misconceptions about Shi’a beliefs and practices, addressing and dispelling these myths can ease tensions and foster mutual understanding. And that’s something we can all appreciate.

(Note: I realize that there may be equally widespread myths about Sunni beliefs amongst the Shi’a. Because I am a Sunni, I am not privy to what the Shi’a may say about Sunnis in their own discussions on this issue. Therefore, I only consider myself competent to write about common Sunni misconceptions about Shi’ism.)

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References:
[1] - http://www.al-islam.org/begin/intro/rahim.html#1
[2] - http://www.answering-ansar.org/fiqh/kalima_adhan/kalima_adhan.pdf
[3] - http://www.al-islam.org/encyclopedia/chapter7/5.html

An interesting debate is currently taking place between Ali Eteraz, creator of online Islamic discussion forum Eteraz.org, and Robert Spencer, director of anti-Islam blog JihadWatch. Spencer is a dedicated Islamophobe whose writings are focused on attempting to prove that jihadist violence and rhetoric represent mainstream Islam, not just the views of fringe extremists. To this end, Spencer wrote an op-ed piece in the Emory University student newspaper The Emory Wheel arguing that “jihad as warfare against non-believers in order to institute Sharia worldwide” is a “constant element of mainstream Islamic theology… affirmed by all four principal schools of Sunni Muslim jurisprudence.” For a bigot, Spencer is a pretty smart guy. Unlike many Islamophobes, Spencer is reasonably well-versed in the intellectual history of Islam. Rather than citing directly to Quran and ahadith, which are always subject to interpretation, he quotes the writings of well-respected mainstream scholars such as ibn Taymiyya, ibn Khaldun, al-Qayrawani, and al-Mawardi on offensive jihad and warfare. Superficially, he seems to have made a convincing case that Muslim terrorism is but a manifestation of mainstream Islamic political theory.

In a post on his website responding to the op-ed, Eteraz correctly identifies the fatal flaw in Spencer’s arguments. He points out Spencer’s failure to distinguish between theology and jurisprudence and notes that none of the scholars Spencer quotes lived past 1406. These are more than just inconsequential oversights; unlike philosophers and theologians, jurists are bound by the context in which they live. While the former are concerned with philosophical matters relating to the attributes of God and the nature of human existence, the latter deal with actual legal and political problems. Opinions of jurists, even when framed in the most general of terms, are always informed by the factual realities of the problems they address.

In the case of jihad and warfare, the opinions of the eminent scholars Spencer quotes are limited by the manner in which they conceptualized war and international relations. Prior to the modern era of nation-states, the world was divided into empires that were in a perpetual state of war with each other. Emperors staked the legitimacy of their empires on religion and justified their invasions and conquests by appealing to God (some would argue that very little has changed). Critically, Islam didn’t create this model; it was born into it. Immediately upon its inception, the nascent Muslim state had to contend with the Christian Byzantine Empire and the Zoroastrian Persian Empire, who were themselves locked in a bitter, religiously-charged conflict. The rise and fall of Muslim empires generally followed the path of their non-Muslim counterparts. For every ibn Taymiyya that called for jihad against kafirs, there was an Urban II that called for a crusade against infidels. For every Haroon al-Rashid that sent Muslim armies to subdue a Christian nation, there was a Charlemagne that sought to conquer “pagans” so that they may be “saved”. In short, nothing that the scholars Spencer quotes or their emperor patrons did violated the established order of international relations. And in an era where the world’s population was a fraction of what it is now, bombs and missiles were nonexistent, and most battles occurred in sparsely-populated countrysides, perpetual war between nations was not nearly as bloody or destructive as it would be today.

Admittedly, what Eteraz describes is a recurring problem in both the writings of bigots such as Spencer and the radical Islamists who give him ammunition. Indeed, Spencer’s op-ed might as well have been authored by Ayman al-Zawahiri. And the problem is not confined to jihadi extremists; as Eteraz notes, today’s Islamic jurists have often exhibited a troubling over-reliance on opinions of the distant past in areas such as women’s rights, minority rights, and the issue of apostasy, among others. But the fact that no modern Muslim nation has sought to wage offensive jihad as a means of spreading Islam is an indication that the overwhelming majoriy of Muslims do not view the writings of past scholars on jihad as wholly applicable today. Muslim hostility toward the West usually stems from American and European policies Muslims perceive to be unjust, not the religion Westerners practice. Even jihadi extremists such as Bin Laden and Zawahiri couch much of their rhetoric in defensive terms. But something tells me Spencer is not interested in these realities. Rather, Spencer’s writings coupled with his support for destructive American and Israeli policies leads one to wonder whether he is on a jihad of his own.

There’s an interesting article in the New York Times about Shi’a-Sunni tensions within the Muslim community in the United States. The article mentions the Muslim Students Association here at the University of Michigan, as well as the Muslim community in Southeastern Michigan (home to the largest concentration of Muslims in North America).

(courtesy of Lubna)

According to this article, the ongoing escalation of Shi’a-Sunni tensions is the result of American efforts to foster and encourage sectarian infighting in the Muslim World. The article claims that the campaign is part of the United States’ anti-Iran policy and is supported by the Arab regimes, who perceive Iran as their biggest threat and rival in the Middle East.

Although I agree with such claims insofar as they are presented as a political analysis, Muslims often exhibit a troubling tendency to attribute sectarian violence exclusively to external forces while ignoring the Muslim role in perpetuating it. There comes a point where we Muslims need to take responsibility for our own shortcomings. Our enemies do indeed have an interest in fostering hatred and distrust between Shi’a and Sunnis, but we’re the ones who are giving them ample opportunities to do so. It’s not Americans who are attacking Shi’a Ashura processions. It’s not Americans who are gunning down worshipers in Shi’a masajid. It’s not Americans who are issuing fatawa pronouncing takfir (excommunication) on the Shi’a, calling them “al-Rawafidh” (the deviants), and deeming them worse than the Jews and Christians. And it’s not Americans who are inspired by these fatawa to perpetrate such horrible crimes. Even here in the United States, many Shi’a can share stories about how they’ve been kicked out of Sunni masajid and discriminated against by their Sunni “brothers”. At some Sunni masajid in the West (usually those with strong Salafi contingents), anti-Shi’a propaganda (usually published by Saudi-backed “da’wah” centers) can be found among the newsletters, fliers, and other materials left for distribution after Friday prayer. Although the majority of Muslims do not harbor hatred toward the Shi’a, this alarming prevalence of anti-Shi’a violence and rhetoric indicates that there are serious problems in our Ummah. Even if external forces are behind such nonsense, whom must we ultimately blame if Muslims are doing the dirty work?

Does the United States manipulate and exacerbate divisions in the Muslim World to serve its own ends? Of course it does. But this is nothing new; these are the same tactics European colonialists used to bring most of the Muslim World under Western domination a century ago. At some point, we need to look inward and acknowledge some painful realities about our own issues. Blaming every problem on America is a counter-productive form of denial and self-delusion.

There are some fights that I wish Muslim-Americans wouldn’t pick. Muslim cab drivers in Minneapolis (who are mostly of Somali descent) are apparently refusing service to passengers who are accompanied by dogs (including disabled passengers with guide dogs) or carrying alcohol. Commissioners of the Minneapolis airport (from which a significant portion of taxi passengers originate) are considering suspending drivers who refuse service to passengers on these grounds. In my opinion, this is a foolish and dangerous battle for these cabbies to be fighting, for a number of reasons.

Firstly, I’m no sheikh, but it seems to me that there are no simple, unambiguous Islamic rules relating to the issues in question. The majority position on dogs in Sunni jurisprudence relates to the impurity of their saliva, hair, and skin, not their mere presence in a particular place (except the home, which is not at issue here). Typically, a taxi driver never comes into contact with his passenger’s dog. And even if he does, each of the three Sunni madhabs (Islamic schools of jurisprudence) that prohibit contact with dogs allows exemptions for hunting and guard dogs, a category that guide dogs presumably fall into. Furthermore, the Maliki madhab does not consider any part of the dog to be impure and does not prohibit contact with them. The cabbies’ refusal to transport passengers carrying alcohol apparently derives from ahadith (oral traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, SAW) that appear to prohibit not just the consumption but also the sale, production, and distribution of alcohol. However, scholars in some Muslim countries that purport to enforce Islamic Law (such as Saudi Arabia) allow non-Muslims to sell and purchase alcohol and carry it aboard flights (which are presumably flown by Muslim pilots). Even in pre-modern times, Muslim rulers (with the blessing of the ‘ulema) traditionally allowed Christian minorities to import wine for use in their religious ceremonies.

Secondly, any litigation these cabbies pursue might set a bad precedent that could make it difficult for Muslims fighting legitimate cases of discrimination. Legally, these cabbies have very little chance of convincing a court that being allowed to refuse service to passengers is a “reasonable accommodation” of their religious beliefs. If the cabbies’ fight actually makes it into an appeals court and is struck down, the court’s opinion could subsequently be used by an unscrupulous employer against a Muslim fighting for the right to pray or keep a beard/hijab at work. Each legal battle Muslims pursue in the courts can’t be viewed in isolation. Our efforts to preserve our rights to practice our religion at work or school must be conducted within an overall strategy, and picking a fight you have no hope of winning is a pretty foolish strategy.

Thirdly, one of the most important battles Muslims are currently fighting is in the hearts and minds of our neighbors and colleagues. Attempting to impose our rules on others reinforces perceptions that Muslims are intolerant fanatics. Worse, it potentially gives publicity to the whacko bigots who insist that Muslim-Americans are evil infiltrators seeking to implement Shari’ah in America. Our community can ill afford to give our enemies more ammunition during a time of intensifying scrutiny of Islam and Muslims. The Minneapolis cabbies and those who counsel them would do well to weigh these concerns before pressing forward with this ill-advised fight.

As if the situation in Iraq couldn’t get any worse, Iraqi and American forces say they foiled an assassination plot targeting Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and other Shi’a religious leaders. 250 fighters were killed in the operation. The plot was apparently part of a broader attempt by a militia to gain control of the city of Najaf, home of the Imam Ali Shrine. The plot was timed to coincide with Ashura, a holy day on which the Shi’a stage public processions to mark the martyrdom of the Prophet Muhammad’s (SAW) grandson Hussain.

When I first heard this news, I figured it was just another instance of Sunni extremists attacking the Shi’a on their holy day. But the plot was apparently the work of a group called the Jund as-Samaa (”Soldiers of Heaven”), some kind of messianic cult. This was the first instance I’ve heard of an Iraqi insurgent group (or resistance movement, depending on your perspective) being referred to by the media as a cult. According to CNN, the group contained both Shi’a and Sunni elements, and its leader (who was killed in the fighting) claimed to be the Mahdi, a messiah whom Muslims believe will emerge near the end of time to restore peace and justice in the world (although both the Shi’a and the Sunnis believe in the concept of the Mahdi, the idea figures much more prominently in Shi’a thought). I can’t seem to find much more information about this particular group or why they wanted to kill Sistani; all the media reports I’ve read are vague on the matter. It’s certainly a bizarre and alarming turn of events. The fact that this movement was able to attract hundreds of followers is an indication of how desperate the situation in Iraq has become; apparently, some Iraqis have taken the ongoing violence as a sign of the apocalypse.

In any event, I’m glad the plot was foiled. Sistani is the highest-ranking Shi’a religious leader in the world. Unlike the Sunnis, the Shi’a have a tightly-structured, hierarchical system of religious authority similar to Catholicism. Sistani’s assassination might have plunged the entire region into all-out war, and would have exacerbated Shi’a-Sunni tensions across the Muslim World. Sistani is also one of the few voices of reason in the ongoing struggle for Iraq’s future, and his assassination would have dealt a tremendous blow to the prospects for peace in Iraq any time soon.

The Dennis Pragers and Virgil Goodes of the world would do well to note that the prospect of a Muslim attaining elected office was raised during the course of constitutional debates in the formative period of the United States. After the Constitutional Convention presented its draft Constitution to the states for ratification in 1787, the North Carolina state legislature debated the merits of a guarantee of religious freedom and a bar against religious tests as a condition to holding public office, provisions the Convention’s draft did not contain. Rep. Henry Abbot, a Baptist minister and a proponent of a religious freedom clause, observed:

The exclusion of religious tests is by many thought dangerous and impolitic. They suppose that if there be no religious test required, pagans, deists, and Mahometans [Muslims] might obtain offices among us, and that the senators and representatives might all be pagans. Every person employed by the general and state governments is to take an oath to support the former. Some are desirous to know how and by whom they are to swear, since no religious tests are required–whether they are to swear by Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Proserpine [sic], or Pluto. . . I would be glad [if] some gentleman would endeavor to obviate these objections, in order to satisfy the religious part of the society.

State commissioner James Iredell (who would later serve on the United States Supreme Court) addressed the concerns mentioned by Abbot:

But it is objected that the people of America may, perhaps, choose representatives who have no religion at all, and that pagans and Mahometans may be admitted into offices. But how is it possible to exclude any set of men, without taking away that principle of religious freedom which we ourselves so warmly contend for? This is the foundation on which persecution has been raised in every part of the world.

Governor Samuel Johnston elaborated:

Those who are Mahometans, or any others who are not professors of the Christian religion, can never be elected to the office of President, or other high office, but in one of two cases. First, if the people of America lay aside the Christian religion altogether, it may happen. Should this unfortunately take place, the people will choose such men as think as they do themselves. Another case is, if any persons of such descriptions should, notwithstanding their religion, acquire the confidence and esteem of the people of America by their good conduct and practice of virtue, they may be chosen.

This debate in the North Carolina legislature would play a pivotal role in shaping the notion of separation of church and state that would come to be a founding principle of American democracy. The legislature ultimately decided that a guarantee of religious freedom was a necessity, and North Carolina withheld its ratification of the Constitution on the grounds that it contained no affirmative declaration of rights. The Bill of Rights–and with it, the provisions guaranteeing religious freedom that would come to be known as the establishment clause and the free exercise clause–was subsequently added in response to North Carolina’s objections, and North Carolina became the 12th state to ratify on November 21, 1789. The rest, as they say, is history, though it seems to have escaped Dennis Prager and Virgil Goode.

Kul ‘am wa antum bi khair (”May every year find you well”), wa taqabbul Allahu minna wa minkum (”May God accept from us, and from you”).

Information about Eid al-Adha

There’s an interesting article in the Washington Post today about a Saudi human rights lawyer who has made a career out of challenging the Kingdom’s powerful religious police, the mutawwa.